Price Construction Co. v. Hal Foutz, Et Ux : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Price Construction Co. v. Hal Foutz, Et Ux : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Thomas S. Taylor; Attorneys for AppellantsRichard S. Dalebout;
Attorney for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Price Construction v. Hal Foutz, No. 16688 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1981
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST~TE OF UTAH 
* 
* 
PRICE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., * 
* 
Plaintiff-Respondent, * 
* 
vs. 
HAL FOUTZ, et ux., 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Defendant-Appellants. * 
* 
* 
Case No. 16,688 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable David Sam, presiding 
RICHARD S. DALEBOUT 
60 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent 
Thomas s. Taylor, for 
Christensen, Taylor & Moody 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appella?ts 
F ~ l ED 
--£.EB ~ ~ 1980 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* 
* 
PRICE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., * 
* 
Plaintiff-Respondent, * 
* 
vs. 
HAL FOUTZ, et ux., 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Defendant-Appellants. * 
* 
* 
Case No. 16,688 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable David Sam, presiding 
RICHARD S. DALEBOUT 
60 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent 
Thomas s. Taylor, for 
Christensen, Taylor & Moody 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POINT II 
POINT III 
POINT IV 
CONCLUSION . 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTRUBED ON APPEAL . . 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 61-2-1 ET SEQ. UCA 
DO NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY RELIEF IN FAVOR OF THE 
APPELLANT AND ADVERSE TO THE RESPONDENT UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE ....... . 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS HAVE NOT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW ESTABLISHED THEIR AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE OF MISREPRESENTATION ....... . 
THE SUBJECT AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS; 
PAROLE EVIDENCE IS NOT ADMISSABLE; DEFENDANTS 
ARE IN DEFAULT OF THE AGREEMENT AND FORFEIT 
THEIR CLAIMS TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY; PLAIN-
TIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE BECAUSE 
OF DEFENDANTS' DEFAULT. 
CASES CITED 
Sharp v. Idaho Investment Corp., 504 P.2d 386 Idaho 1972) . 
Jensen Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276,323 P.2d 259 (1958) 
Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 
369 P.2d 928, 929, (1962) ..... 
Maw v. Noble, supra, 354 P.2d at 123. . ... 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (61-2-2). 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, ( 61-2-1). 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (61-2-17) 
Utah Rules of Civil Practice, [7 5 (p) (2) l 
1 
1 
2 
2 
12 
14 
16 
19 
23 
17, 18 
20, 21 
21 
21 
2, 14 
14, 17 
15 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* 
* 
PRICE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., * 
* 
Plaintiff-Respondent, * 
* 
vs. 
HAL FOUTZ, et ux., 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Defendants-Appellants.* 
* 
* 
Case No. 16,688 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit in unlawful detainer against 
Defendants for possession of home and treble damages; together 
with an action for the Court determining ownership and immediate 
possession of the residence together with a reasonable attorney's 
fee and costs. Defendant counterclaimed for specific perfor-
mance of contract or in the alternative to specific performance, 
damages, both compensatory and punitive together with a reason-
able attorney's fee and costs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable David Sam of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah county, without a jury, ruled that the written 
Agreement between the parties was clear and unambiguous; that 
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Plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession of the house and 
ordered Defendants to vacate the residence; that Defendants 
were entitled to have returned the $10,000.00 down payment less 
$350.00 per month as rent for the premises during Defendants' 
occupancy. The Court ruled that the Defendants were in default 
under the Agreement between the parties. The Court further 
ruled that Defendants were guilty of unlawful detainer, that 
Plaintiff was entitled to treble damages but offset the treble 
damages by reason of the increased value of the house since 
the parties entered into the contract of sale. The Court allowed 
an offset of Plaintiff's damages against the $10,000.00 down 
payment which Defendants made on the house. The Court gave 
Defendants credit for $300.00 improvement on the yard, improve-
ments in the house not to exceed $1,000.00 and awarded Plaintiff 
$1,550.00 in attorney's fee together with costs. The Court 
ruled that 61-2-2 UCA, 1953, was not applicable. The Court 
further ruled that the Plaintiff had made full disclosure to 
Defendants and had not misrepresented the house. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the decision and 
judgment of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With reference to rule 75 (p) (2) URCP, the respondent 
disagrees with the statement of facts contained in the Brief of 
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the Appellant. The Respondent hereafter states the facts, 
relevant to the points raised on appeal as it finds them: 
(The Agreement) 
On May 25, 1978, the parties entered into a written 
Agreement, Exhibit 1. (T.3-4). Under the terms of the Agree-
ment (Exhibit 1) Price Construction Company, the Plaintiff and 
Respondent, agreed to sell to Hal Foutz and Liane Foutz, the 
Defendants and Appellants, a certain residence located at 757 
North 450 East, Orem, Utah. Exhibit l states, inter alia at 
lines 47 and 48: "this earnest money supersedes earnest money 
written November 29, 1977 .•. " Exhibit l also acknowledges at 
lines 49 and SO an earnest money deposit of $600.00. Also, 
conunencing at line 14, Exhibit l acknowledges receipt of a 
payment of $10,000.00 from the buyers to the seller. Exhibit 
l provides that buyers shall pay monthly rent in the amount of 
$350.00 per month until August 1, 1978 at which time the house 
was to close at which time the balance of $41,400.00 shown on 
line 14 was to be paid. Exhibit l further provides that if the 
closing did not take place as scheduled on August 1, 1978, 
that buyers would return possession of the residence to the seller 
and the sellers would refund the $10,000.00 deposit when the home 
was sold. 
Exhibit l provides at line 52 that "time is of the 
essence of this Agreement." 
The Court found that Exhibit l was not ambiguous and 
was a fair contract; (T.13, T.79, T.90) Accordingly, the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Court, with reference to lines 47 and 48 of Exhibit 1, quoted 
above, declined to receive into evidence a prior earnest money 
between the parties dated November 29, 1977. 
There is no reference in the Agreement of the parties, 
Exhibit 1, to FHA or VA financing. The box on the multiple 
listing agreement (Exhibit 5) wherein a seller evidences an 
agreement to pay FHA or VA points is not checked. 
(Alleged Misrepresentations as to FHA or VA Financing) 
Apart from the written Agreements, the Defendants were 
advised that the Plaintiff would not agree to an FHA or VA sale 
(with an accompanying payment of "points" by seller). The 
record shows the following: 
Mr. Whitney Lund was the real estate agent who handled 
the sales transaction for the subject residence. He had several 
discussions with the Defendants: 
"I told Mr. and Mrs. Foutz that the seller had not 
agreed to pay the FHA or VA points on the home, but 
that the home-or rather they could probably finance 
the home FHA if they were willing to make an offer 
at a higher price than $52,000.00 list price. (T.42) 
On cross-examination by counsel for the Defendants, 
Mr. Lund clarified his testimony regarding FHA or VA financing: 
"I did not tell Mr. Foutz that the house would 
qualify for FHA or VA. I told him it would pro-
bably qualify and we had discussed that prior to 
making the original offer in November of 1977. (T.51) 
Later in the trial, Mr. Lund was again asked about 
FHA or VA financing. He was specifically asked if he had dis-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
cussed such financing with Mr. Price, the principal of Price 
Construction Company and Mr. Lund stated: 
"Okay. Mr. Price has always stated that he would not 
pay the discount points with regards to FHA or VA offers, 
but he would consider paying them if the sales price 
came in higher." (T.54) 
Mr. Lund was then asked if he conveyed the foregoing 
conversation to the Defendants, to which he responded: 
"We determined that we would go conventionally rather 
than FHA or VA." (T.54) 
Mr. Lund was again asked about FHA or VA financing and 
the following questions and answers ensued: 
"Q. Did you relay the conversation that you had with 
Mr. Price regarding the VA and FHA to Mr. and Mrs. Foutz? 
A. Yes. I did. 
Q. What response, if any did they make to the con-
versation that you relayed to them? 
A. After showing them some financial calculations 
on how much money they would save by going either way, 
they· deten:i.ined that it would be best if they went con-
ventionally and that is how the offer was made. 
Q. I believe you testified that you filled out Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 1, is that correct sir? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Was that done on the meeting on May 25, 1978, 
at which meeting Mr. Price and Mr. and Mrs. Foutz and 
yourself was present? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If Price Construction were to pay FHA and VA points, 
is there a customary practice in the industry with respect 
to the manner in which you indicate that on the pro-
spective agreement? 
A. There is a custom or practice in the industry, at 
least in this valley, if an offer is going to be made 
FHA or VA because points can fluctuate anywhere from 
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three to ten per cent. We normally put the maximum 
amount of points which the seller will agree to pay 
on a FHA or VA offer. 
Q. Does any language such as that appear on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1 as you can observe it? (indicating) 
A. No language appears." (T.55, emphasis added) 
The multiple listing agreement, Exhibit 5, contains 
no reference to payment by seller of FHA or VA points and there 
was testimony that it is customary in Utah County to indicate 
an agreement by the seller to pay points if the residence is 
to be sold FHA or VA. (T.52) 
Exhibit 1 was signed by the parties on May 25, 1978, 
at which meeting Mr. Whitney Lund, the real estate agent, Mr. 
Brian Crandall, a representative of Price Construction Company 
and Mr. and Mrs. Foutz were in attendance. With regard to 
that meeting, Mr. Crandall was asked whether FHA or VA points were 
discussed and Mr. Crandall responded: 
"THE WITNESS: It was brought up by Mr. Foutz. He men-
tioned a little background at this point as they were 
pleading for an extension of time. They insisted they 
had financing in process and they wanted an extension 
and he brought up the point that the reasons they 
needed an extension is that they had wasted time trying 
to get FHA and VA financing. 
Q. To which you responded? 
A. I was surprised because this is the first time we 
had heard that they were even interested in FHA and 
VA being the offer was made conventional. 
Q. What did you say to Mr. Foutz? 
A. I said that it can't go FHA or VA. 
Q. To which he responded? 
A. He says that I know that now. 
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Q. This was prior to the signing of the agreement? 
A. This was before they signed the offer. That is 
correct. 
Q. That is all." (T.120-121, emphasis added) 
Mr. Brian Crandall also testified as follows regarding 
FHA or VA financing: 
Q. Now were you present at the time that Exhibit l 
was filled out? 
A. Yes I was. 
Q. Did you or the real estate agent at anytime suggest 
that it be placed on Exhibit l that the home would not 
qualify for FHA or VA financing? 
A. No, it was not. It was not brought up. 
Q. Didn't you think that was rather a significant point, 
a person buying a home? 
A. No, because Mr. Foutz did understand that it not go 
FHA. There was no reason to put that on there." (T.122-12'. 
The Defendant himself was asked on cross-examination 
about his understanding regarding FHA and VA financing at the 
time Exhibit l was signed by the parties on May 25, 1978. Mr. 
Foutz testified as follows: 
"Q. I would be glad to talk as loud as you would like. 
You testified did you not at the beginning of your 
testimony that at the meeting on May 25, 1978, you under-
stood that Mr. Price would not pay the points? 
A. That is correct. That is what Mr. Whitney Lund told 
us. Mr. Price never told us. 
Q. You understood through Mr. Lund that Mr. Price would 
not pay FHA or VA points? 
A. That is correct." (T.99, emphasis added) 
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(Plaintiff as Owner or a Broker) 
On the question of ownership of the subject residence, 
Mr. Lawrence M. Price testified that he was president of Price 
Construction Company, Inc. (T.3) Mr. Price then testifies 
as follows: 
"Q. Is Price Construction Company the owner and builder 
of the subject residence located at or about 757 North 
450 East in Orem? 
A. Yes sir." 
There was no evidence contracting the foregoing testimony 
as to ownership of the subject residence. 
The record demonstrates the following with respect to 
the $600.00 earnest money and the $10,000.00 down payment paid 
by the Defendants: Mr. Lawrence Price testified that the initial 
$600.00 earnest money deposit was paid to Courtesy Realty at 
the time of the initial offer in approximately November of 1977 
and that said amount was later in August of 1978 devided between 
Courtesy Realty and Mr. Whitney Lund and the Plaintiff corporation. 
Mr. Price futher testified that the $10,000.00 down payment was 
made directly to Price Construction Company by which the money 
was used to pay off obligations for purchase of the subject lot. 
(T.16) 
Mr. Whitney Lund likewise testified that the $10,000.00 
down payment was made directly to Plaintiff. (T.38) 
After the August 1, 1978 closing date had passed the 
$600.00 was divided with Courtesy Realty retaining $150.00, 
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the salesman, Mr. Lund receiving $150.00 and Larry Price received 
$300.00. (T.46-47) At page 87 of the transcript, the Defendant, 
Mrs. Foutz, testified on cross-examination that, apparently, it 
was her understanding that Price Construction would use the 
$10,000.00, at the time it was received, to pay off certain debts 
with respect to the home. (T.87) 
(Fairness and Equities Between the Parties) 
Commencing at page 90 of the transcript, the Court made 
an extended observation concerning the facts in evidence to 
that point in the trial. Commencing part way through the com-
ments of the Court, Judge Sam stated as follows: 
" •.. but as I read the contract I feel that it appears 
on its face to be a very fair contract. I don't see 
anything on the contract on its fact that would in any 
way appear not to be entirely fair. In fact, it appears 
in my judgment to be fairer than most contracts relative 
to monies paid down. This contract provides that the 
$10,000.00 will be returned and it appears that these 
buyers, unfortunate as it appears to be, that they are 
unable to get financing which I don't know how you can 
penalize the seller for that fact. The fact that they 
can't get financing, I don't know how you can penalize 
the seller for that unfortunate circumstance. I feel 
bad that they haven't been able to get financing, but 
to ask this court to carry this, the occupancy of this 
home on at infinitum--it has been occupied now since, 
apparently I gather now from this testimony I thought 
it was May of 1978 but it has been occupied by these 
Defendants since December of 1977 apparenlty? 
MR. TAYLOR: That is correct sir. 
THE COURT: And if they are unable to get financing, 
I don't know how you can penalize the seller for that 
unless the seller did some act that was so offensive 
in the way of fraud or misrepresentation or through 
some fraudulent inducement that causes these buyers 
these problems and I do not at this point see those 
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types of facts. Now what else do you have to present? 
You may proceed to try and convince me, but I don't 
s7e those types of ~acts and circumstances in this par-
ticular case. Now if you have law on this question of 
this seller being a real estate broker and using this 
$10,000.00 in some dubious illegal way pursuant to the 
statutes, maybe you can convince me on this but this 
defendant says that it was her understanding that they 
were going to pay off the debts with that $10,000.00. 
I don't see the type of conduct or even the statute 
we are concerned with here that would cause me to make 
some finding that would penalize this seller when it 
appears on the face of this contract that they pre-
pared a contract for--on its face it appears to be 
extremely fair. Counsel now that is my observation. 
(T. 90-91) 
Lastly, it should be observed that two original transcripts 
of the trial proceedings have been made. The foregoing statement 
of facts have been taken from an original transcript dated July 
17 I 1979. 
(Matters not in the Record) 
At trial, there was contradictory testimony from witnesses 
for both Defendants as to whether the buyers, Mr. and Mrs. Foutz, 
as opposed to the seller, could pay the FHA and VA points. Sub-
sequent to trial, Exhibits were attached to Memoranda by the 
parties supplementing their position on this issue. Appellants 
have included some of these Exhibits, which were not received 
into evidence, as part of their statement of facts. It is the 
position of the Plaintiff that these Exhibits, which were not 
received at trial, should not be considered on appeal. In the 
event the Court decides it should consider the same, the Plaintiff 
makes reference to the letter attached to its Memorandum of Points 
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and Authorities dated June 7, 1977, from Mr. L. c. Romney, 
Supervisor of Region VIII of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to the effect that regulations of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development "require that the discount points, 
if any, are paid by the seller of the property." 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE FINDING OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. 
It is the established rule of the Utah Supreme court that 
Findings of Fact made by a trial judge will not be disturbed 
on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence. 
Mr. Lawrence Price, President of the Plaintiff corpor-
ation testified that that corporation was the owner and builder 
of the subject residence. The sales Agreement, Exhibit 1 
recites the Plaintiff, Price Construction Company as the seller 
of the subject agreement. Based on this competent evidence, 
it is respectfully submitted that the trial court, Judge Sam, 
correctly found at paragraph one of the Findings of Fact that 
the Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, is the owner of a residence 
located at or about 757 North 450 East, Orem, Utah. 
The transcript of proceedings and the foregoing Statement 
of Facts demonstrate that the Defendants and Appellants were 
repeatedly advised that the Plaintiff would not agree to FHA 
or VA financing. Consistent therewith, the multiple listing 
agreement, Exhibit 5, and the actual agreement between the parties, 
Exhibit 1, contains no expression to the effect that the seller 
and Plaintiff would pay FHA or VA points. Testimony was received 
that it is customary in the real estate practice in Utah County 
to show in the earnest money agreement, that the seller will 
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pay FHA or VA points because the same are a considerable expense 
to the seller. Accordingly, there was considerable competent 
evidence to support findings to the effect that the Plaintiff 
did not agree to sell the subject residence by FHA or VA finan-
cing. 
Further, there is competent evidence to support the 
findings of the Court that the Plaintiff made no misrepresen-
tations to Defendants prior to signing the subject agreement, 
Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Lawrence Price and Mr. Whitney Lund both testified 
thatthe$600.00 earnest money deposit was paid to Plaintiff 
through Century 21 Courtesy Realty and that the Defendants 
thereafter paid $10,000.00 as down payment directly to the 
Plaintiff and that Defendants had full knowledge and disclosure 
of these actions. 
The Defendants admit they remain in the subject residence 
and that they did not close as required on August 1, 1978. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff and Respondent 
respectfully submit that the trial court correctly found in favor 
of the Plaintiff on all of the foregoing Findings of Fact, which 
Findings should be sustained by the Court on appeal. 
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POINT II 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 61-2-1 
ET SEQ. UCA DO NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY 
RELIEF IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT AND 
ADVERSE TO THE RESPONDENT UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
The Court at paragraph one (1) of its Findings of Fact 
"Plaintiff, a Utah Corporation, is the owner of a res-
idence located at or about 757 North 450 East, Orem, 
Utah." 
That same Plaintiff is the seller to the Defendants under the 
terms of the subject Agreement, Exhibit 1. 
The provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA control 
the activities, inter alia of real estate brokers as defined in 
Section 61-2-2 UCA. An exception to the application of Section 
61-2-1 et ~· UCA is found in the second paragraph of Section 
61-2-2 UCA: 
"The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any 
person, partnership, association or corporation who 
as owner or lessor shall perform any of the acts afore-
mentioned with reference to property owned or leased 
by such person, partnership, association or corporation 
nor to isolated transactions by persons holding a duly 
executed power of attorney from the owner nor shall 
this chapter be construed to include in any way the 
services rendered by an attorney at law in performing 
his duties as such attorney at law nor shall it apply 
to a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator, 
or executor, or any person acting under order of any 
court nor to a trustee under a deed of trust of [or] 
a will nor to their employees." (Section 61-2-2 UCA, 
emphasis added) 
It is thus respectfully submitted that the provisions of 
Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA do not apply to the Plaintiff in this 
action which was selling property owned by it. 
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In addition, reference is made to Section 61-2-17 which 
is the penalty provision for the subject chapter on real estate 
brokers. Subsection (a) of 61-2-17 provides criminal penalties 
and thus does not have application to the present action. Sub-
section (b) provides for money damages for violation of the pro-
visions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA. With reference to that 
subsection, it is respectfully submitted that no monies were 
received by the Plaintiff as commission, compensation or profit 
by or in consequence of the Plaintiff's violation of any pro-
vision of the subject act, nor was there any evidence demonstra-
ting damages within the meaning of said subsection. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff and Respondent 
respectfully submits to the Court that no claim or relief under 
the provisions of Section 61-2-1 et seq. UCA has been demon-
strated under the facts of the case as found in the transcript 
of the proceedings. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS HAVE NOT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW ESTABLISHED THEIR 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MISREPRESENTATION. 
The defense of misrepresentation is affirmative and the 
burden is upon the Defendant to establish it by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
The contractual defenses of misrepresentation and fraud 
each include the proposition that the offending party must be 
demonstrated to have misstated a material fact and that the mis-
statement, if any, was relied upon by the other party, in this 
case the Defendants, as a basis upon which he determined to enter 
into the subject Agreement. 
In the present action, Mr. Brian Crandall, Mr. Lawrence 
Price and Mr. Whitney Lund affirmatively testified that at all 
times they had advised Mr. Foutz that Price Construction Company 
would not agree to sell the subject house by means of FHA or 
VA financing. Mr. Foutz, upon cross-examination, indicated 
that prior to entering into the Agreement on May 25, 1978, he 
knew Price would not pay FHA or VA points. 
Cross-examination of Mr. Foutz demonstrated that the 
Plaintiff made no misstatement to mislead Mr. Foutz with respect 
to FHA or VA financing prior to entering into the May 25, 1978 
Agreement. Cross-examination likewise demonstrated that Mr. 
Foutz could not have relied upon Price Construction Company to 
cooperate with the FHA or VA financing because he understood 
prior to entering into the subject Agreement that Mr. Price would 
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not cooperate with the same. 
Thus, there is neither a misstatement nor any reliance 
upon any misstatement. 
In Sharp vs. Idaho Investment Corp., 504 P.2d 386 (Idaho 
1972), a Dr. Sharp alleged fraudulent misrepresentations on 
the part of the Idaho Investment Corporation pursuant to which 
he purchased certain stock. The Idaho Supreme Court, in the 
foregoing case, used the following language in regard to reliance 
"Reliance is a fundamental element of fraud which must 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In order 
for the respondent, Dr. Sharp, to secure redress he must 
have, in fact, relied upon a statement or representation 
as an inducement to purchase the stock. We find a not-
able absence of the element of reliance supporting the 
district court's finding of fraud. 
On direct examination Dr. Sharp was asked: "Doctor, 
would you tell me why you purchased stock in the Idaho 
Investment Corporation?" Dr. Sharp replied, "Because 
I believed Mr. Neilson. I was acquainted with Mr. 
Frazier and other officers of Sierra Life. I knew the 
officers and expected it to be a profitable venture." 
This answer reveals a common theme which appears through· 
out the record. Dr. Sharp was an investor in Sierra 
Life Insurance Company, an Idaho corporation. By coin-
cidence most of the officers of Idaho Investment Cor-
poration were officials of Sierra Life Insurance Com-
pany. For example, Fred Frazier was president of both 
Idaho Investment Corporation and Sierra Life Insurance 
Company. Although this inter-locking feature of cor-
porate officials was publicized extensively by Idaho 
Investment Corporation in its sales materials and 
company news bulletins, neither the respondents nor 
the district court chose to attach any significance 
to its connection with the element of reliance. From 
Dr. Sharp's own testimony it is evident that rather---
than relying on representations or misstatements by 
Idaho Investment Corporation and its agents he relied 
on expectations based on his experience with another 
corporation." Sharp vs. Idaho Investment Corporation, 
supra, (emphasis added). 
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The Defendant, Mr. Foutz was questioned at page 99 of 
the transcript to determine if he had, in signing the subsequent 
Agreement, Exhibit 1, relied upon facts relating to the appli-
cation of FHA or VA financing to the subject residence. In the 
manner of Dr. Sharp in Sharp vs. Idaho Investment Corporation, 
supra, Mr. Foutz admitted that he knew when he signed the sub-
ject Agreement that Price Construction would not agree to such 
forms of financing. He thus could not have justifiably relied 
upon ideas to the contrary. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the Defendants and Appellants have failed to establish 
their affirmative defense of misrepresentation. 
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POINT IV 
THE SUBJECT AGREEMENT IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS; PAROLE EVIDENCE IS NOT 
ADMISSABLE; DEFENDANTS ARE IN DEFAULT 
OF THE AGREEMENT AND FORFEIT THEIR 
CLAIMS TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY; 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ATTOR-
NEY'S FEE BECAUSE OF DEFENDANTS' 
DEFAULT. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Agreement 
between the parties is fair, clair and not ambiguous. The trial 
court thus correctly held the parties to the terms thereof and 
correctly refused to permit the Defendants to vary the terms 
of that Agreement as to financing and other matters. 
The subject Agreement, Exhibit 1, provides that Defen-
dants were to close on August 1, 1978. There are no exceptions 
stated. The Defendants were to pay the balance of $41,400.00 
at the closing. No exceptions are stated. If the closing did 
not take place on August 1, 1978, the Defendants were to move 
out and they would be repaid their $10,000.00 down payment 
when Plaintiff could resell the home. No exception is stated. 
Time is of the essence. See line 52 of the subject Agreement. 
Defendants did not close as required and they refused 
to move out of the subject residence. They were in default 
and forfeited their claims against the property. Plaintiff is 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee, lines 45-46 of Exhibit 
1, because of the defendant's default. 
Defendants will receive back their down payment less 
rent accrued and Plaintiff is therefore not unjustly enriched. 
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Defendants can not rightly claim to have specific enforce-
ment of this subject Agreement with respect to which they are in 
default. 
The trial court correctly refused to permit the Defendants 
to amend the terms of the Agreement, Exhibit 1, by parole evi-
dence. 
The intent and obligations of the parties to their 
Agreement should be determined from the language within the four 
corners thereof because it is free of ambiguity. 
The foregoing rule represents a conscious policy decision 
on the part of the Utah Supreme Court. The parties should be 
held to their clearly expressed intention or the orderly conduct 
of affairs would quickly stop. If the Defendants were allowed to 
amend the Agreement to now substitute their wish to finance by 
way of FHA or VA financing and the accompanying payment of dis-
count points together with other privileges all of which are 
clearly not referred to in the subject Agreement, there would 
be an end to reliable and dependable contracts. Thus, Justice 
Henroid in Jensen Used Cars vs. Rice, (1958): 
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts we 
seek to determine the intentions of the parties. But 
it is also elementary and of extreme practical impor-
tance that we hold contracting parties to their clear 
and understandable language deliberately committed 
to writing and endorsed by them as signato:ies 
thereto. Were this not so business, one with anoth7r 
among our citizens, would be relegated to the chaotic, 
and the basic purpose of the law to supp~y enforceable 
rules of conduct for the maintenance and improvement of 
an orderly society's welfare and progress would find 
itself impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold one 
responsible for language which he himself espouses. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-21-
such language is themly implement he gives us to 
fashion a determination as to the intentions of the 
parties. Under such circumstances we should not be 
required to embosom any request that we ignore that 
very language. This is as it should be. The rule 
excluding matters outside the four corners of a clear, 
understandable document, is a fair one, and one's con-
tentions concerning his intent should extend no further 
than his own clear expressions." 
Jensen Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958). 
The Agreement between the parties of May 25, 1978 is 
quite clear and specific. Utah law would permit the trial court 
to listen to parole explanations by the Defendants Hal and Liane 
Foutz "only where there is some genuine lack of certainty." The 
phrase "genuine lack of certainty" does not refer to "strained 
or merely fanciful or wishful interpretations that may be 
indulged in." Maw v. Noble, supra, 354 P.2d at 123. 
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule is to 
determine what the parties intended by what they said. 
The court may not add, ignore or discard words in the 
process, but attempts to render certain the meaning 
of the provision in dispute by an objective and rea-
sonable construction of the whole contract." 
Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 
928 I 929 I (1962) • 
"In considering the controversy here it is well to keep 
in mind the fundamental concepts in regard to contracts: 
that their purpose is to reduce to writing the condi-
tions upon which the minds of the parties have met 
and to fix their rights and duties in respect thereto. 
The intent so expressed is to be found, if possible with-
in the four corners of the instrument itself in accor-
dance with the ordinary accepted meaning of the words 
used. Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language so that the meaning is confused, or is sus-
ceptible or more than one meaning, there is no justi-
fication for interpretation or explanation from extran-
eous sources. It would defeat the very purpose of formal 
contracts to permit a party to invoke the use of words 
or conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove that the 
parties did not mean what they said, or to use such in-
consistent works to conduct to demonstrate uncertainty 
or ambiguity where none would otherwise exist." 
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The terms of the Agreement of May 25, 1978, control. 
There is no reference to payment of FHA or VA discount points 
and no agreement to cooperate in FHA or VA financing. The 
terms of that Agreement are quite specific as to the amount of 
cash to be paid and the time at which such shall be paid. The 
Agreement is likewise clear that time is of the essence and it 
is further clear that previous agreements are specifically 
superseded by the subject Agreement. Whether or not Price 
Construction Company could have agreed to FHA or VA financing 
is immaterial. The Plaintiff simply did not agree to it. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the lower court correctly held the parties to the terms 
of the subject Agreement and refused specific enforcement of 
the subject Agreement in favor of the Defendants and granted 
Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted that the trial court correctly determined the facts 
in this matter based upon the evidence received at trial. It 
is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law made by the Court after trial accurately state 
the facts in the case and the Plaintiff I respectfully requests I 
the Court to affirm the decision of the lower court, the Honorable1 
David Sam, presiding. 
Respectfully submitted: 
RICHARD S. DALEBOUT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and exact copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed to Thomas s. 
Street, Provo, 
Utah 84601, postage prepaid, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
